
Vogtle Unit 3 2Q/2013 Performance Summary

Construction Action Matrix Column:

Licensee Response



Most Significant Inspection Findings

2Q/2013	No findings this quarter					
1Q/2013	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter
4Q/2012	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter
3Q/2012	<u>G</u>	<u>G</u>	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter

Additional Inspection and Assessment Information -

- List of Construction Inspection Reports
- <u>List of Construction Assessment</u> Reports/Inspection Plans

Design Engineering

Identified By: NRC

Identification Date: 9/30/2012

Significance: Green **Item Type:** ITAAC Finding

ITAAC Finding for Failure to Translate CA01 and CA20 Design Requirements Into Specifications and Drawings

An ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a violation (VIO) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," were identified by the inspectors on and before October 2, 2012, regarding the licensee's failure to assure that regulatory requirements and the design basis for safety-related systems, structures, and components were correctly translated into specifications and instructions associated with the structural submodules for portions of the auxiliary building and containment internal structures. The inspectors identified multiple examples of the licensee's failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for safety-related systems, structures, and components were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, and instructions.

The inspectors determined this issue was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to assure that regulatory requirements and the design basis for the auxiliary building and containment internal structures were correctly translated into specifications and instructions could adversely affect the closure of an ITAAC. The finding was associated with the Design/Engineering Cornerstone. The finding was determined to be an ITAAC finding because it was material to the acceptance criteria of Unit 3 ITAACs 763 and 760. Specifically, the acceptance criteria for ITAAC 763 and ITAAC 760 require that a report exists and concludes that the as-built structures in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, and the as-built containment internal structures, respectively, conform to the approved design. However, the as-built Seismic Category I Structural Submodules CA20-04, CA20-07A, CA20-08A, CA20-29 and CA01-24 did not conform to the approved design. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the construction SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not impair the design function of the nuclear island auxiliary building or containment internal structures and was assigned to Row 1 of the risk importance table. The inspectors screened the finding for a possible construction safety focus component (CSFC) aspect in accordance with Appendix F. "Construction Safety Focus Components and Aspects," of IMC 0613P, "Power Reactor Construction Inspection Reports -Pilot." The inspectors determined that this finding was not related to any of the CSFC aspects discussed in IMC 0613P.

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Procurement/Fabrication

Identified By: NRC

Identification Date: 9/30/2012

Significance: Green **Item Type:** ITAAC Finding

Failure to Assure Safety Related Materials Conformed to the Procurement Documents

An ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and three examples of a VIO of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services," were identified by the inspectors for SNC's failure, through its contractor Stone and Webster (Shaw), to ensure that purchased material conformed to procurement documents. Specifically, the inspectors identified that (1) submodule CA20-04, (2) auxiliary building embed plates, and (3) nuclear island reinforcing steel were

accepted but did not conform to the approved design. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR 531786.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the issue, if left uncorrected, represented a failure to establish and implement an adequate program and quality oversight function that could render the quality of construction activities unacceptable or indeterminate. Additionally, this issue was considered to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could adversely affect the closure of an ITAAC. The finding was associated with the Procurement/Fabrication Cornerstone. This finding was determined to be an ITAAC finding because examples 1 and 3 were material to the acceptance criteria of Vogtle Unit 3 ITAACs 763 and 762. Specifically, the acceptance criteria for these ITAAC require that a report exists and concludes that the as-built structures in the non-radiologically controlled and radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building, respectively, conform to the approved design. However, as-built submodule CA20-04 and nuclear island reinforcing steel did not conform to the approved design. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the construction SDP and determined this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not impair the design function of the nuclear island basemat or auxiliary building and was assigned to Row 1 of the risk importance table. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Baseline Inspection. Construction Experience, because the licensee and Shaw did not adequately implement and institutionalize construction experience through changes to construction processes, procedures, materials, and training programs [A.6(b)].

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